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We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents
trade in asset markets to reallocate risk. We characterize the kinds of infor-
mation that allow a welfare improvement when portfolios can be freely reallo-
cated. We then compare competitive equilibria before and after a change in
information. We show that generically, if markets are suﬃciently incomplete,
the welfare eﬀects are completely arbitrary: there typically exist changes in
information that make all agents better oﬀ, or all agents worse oﬀ.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D52, D60, D80.
Keywords: Competitive Equilibrium, Incomplete Markets, Value of Informa-
tion.
21 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze the value of information in the setup of
a competitive exchange economy under uncertainty in which agents trade in asset
markets to reallocate risk. It is well known that while information cannot reduce
welfare in a single-agent decision-making context, this is not necessarily the case
in a market setting. In a competitive economy with complete markets, the arrival
of information prior to trading cannot improve upon the equilibrium allocation of
risk. Such information can in fact impair risk sharing, and this is true whether or
not markets are complete. Indeed, if the true state of the world is revealed before
markets open, no mutually beneﬁcial risk sharing trade is possible.
The negative eﬀect on welfare of an increase in the information available to market
participants has come to be known as the Hirshleifer eﬀect, after Hirshleifer (1971)
who produced an early example of it. In general, the Hirshleifer eﬀect is due to
changes in equilibrium prices, induced by a change in information, that alter the
budget sets of agents (see Gottardi and Rahi (2001)).
If markets are incomplete, a second welfare eﬀect arises. With additional informa-
tion agents can achieve a larger set of state-contingent payoﬀs by conditioning their
portfolios on this information. We refer to this as the Blackwell eﬀect, after Blackwell
(1951) who compared the value of diﬀerent information structures in single-agent de-
cision problems. Roughly speaking, we can think of the value of information in a
competitive market economy as having a negative component due to the Hirshleifer
eﬀect, and a positive component due to the Blackwell eﬀect.
There is an extensive literature on the value of information in a competitive pure
exchange setting. A long line of papers has followed Hirshleifer’s lead in comparing
competitive equilibrium allocations associated with diﬀering levels of information.
Assuming complete markets, Schlee (2001) derives conditions under which more in-
formation is Pareto worsening. Green (1981) and Hakansson et al. (1982) provide
(quite restrictive) conditions under which better information leads to a Pareto im-
provement when markets are incomplete. Milne and Shefrin (1987) show, by way of
examples, that better information can lead to any pattern of welfare changes in an
incomplete markets economy.
In this paper we provide a general characterization of the eﬀect of changes in
information on welfare, starting from a competitive equilibrium allocation, in the
context of a two-period exchange economy with a single consumption good and a
single round of asset trade. We provide two sets of results, the ﬁrst in a situation
where a hypothetical planner can freely reallocate portfolios after a change in infor-
mation, and the second where we consider only equilibrium allocations corresponding
to the new information. We refer to these as results relating to feasible changes in
welfare and equilibrium changes in welfare, respectively.
Feasible welfare changes can be attributed entirely to the Blackwell eﬀect. Since
prices do not constrain attainable allocations, there is no Hirshleifer eﬀect. Just
as in a single-agent decision problem, information cannot reduce welfare, as it can
3simply be disregarded. We characterize the set of informational changes for which
a Pareto improvement can be achieved. In doing so, we obtain a characterization
of risk sharing with incomplete markets that is of independent interest. The state
space can be partitioned into a collection of “insurable events” such that, in equi-
librium for a generic economy, all gains from trade in state-contingent consumption
are exhausted between these events, but not within them. While a change in infor-
mation that aﬀects only the relative probabilities of insurable events has no value,
a Pareto improvement can typically be attained for informational changes that alter
the relative probabilities of states within an insurable event.
The information structures that allow a Pareto improvement in our model with a
single round of trade are precisely those that lead to retrade in a setting where asset
markets open both before and after the change in information under consideration.
As such our results are related to those of Blume et al. (2006). In particular, one
of our results is a generalization of their main theorem (see Section 4 for further
details).
Next we consider equilibrium welfare changes, comparing agents’ welfare at a
competitive equilibrium before and after a change in information. We show that
generically, if markets are suﬃciently incomplete, equilibrium welfare eﬀects are com-
pletely arbitrary: there typically exist informational changes that make all agents
better oﬀ, or all agents worse oﬀ, or indeed any subset of agents better (or worse)
oﬀ. Thus pecuniary externalities arising from price changes can outweigh the value
that a change in information might otherwise have for any individual agent. To put
it diﬀerently, when both the Hirshleifer and Blackwell eﬀects are present, the net
eﬀect can go in any direction.
Our welfare analysis is in the spirit of the literature on constrained ineﬃciency in
an incomplete markets economy, where welfare comparisons are made between com-
petitive equilibrium allocations and allocations attainable subject to appropriately
speciﬁed constraints. Diamond (1967) allows arbitrary reallocations of portfolios and
shows that competitive equilibria are constrained eﬃcient. In our results on feasible
welfare changes, we identify conditions under which a welfare improvement can be
achieved when information is modiﬁed as well as portfolios. Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) consider the eﬀect of portfolio
reallocations on spot commodity prices, and establish a constrained ineﬃciency re-
sult; the ﬁrst paper shows that constrained ineﬃciency is, in fact, a generic property.
In order to establish our equilibrium welfare result, we utilize the analytical appa-
ratus developed by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), and later generalized by
Citanna et al. (1998). This approach has been employed in several papers in the
incomplete markets literature including, in particular, Cass and Citanna (1998) and
Elul (1995), who show that generically the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of a
new asset are arbitrary. We provide such a result with respect to changes in public
information.1
1We are able to exploit diﬀerential techniques by employing a smooth parametrization of changes
in information, just as Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) are able to use these techniques
4The closest result to ours on equilibrium welfare changes is in Citanna and Vil-
lanacci (2000), who study the value of information in an asymmetric information
economy with nominal assets. In their model, there is a continuum of equilibria which
can be parametrized by the (state-contingent) price level. The authors show that
generically there is an arbitrary change in welfare when moving from a non-revealing
equilibrium to a nearby equilibrium at which asset prices reveal some information.
In contrast, we show that there is an arbitrary change in welfare when moving from
any equilibrium of a generic economy to a nearby equilibrium associated with a new
information structure. Also, the welfare eﬀects in Citanna and Villanacci (2000)
involve changes in real asset payoﬀs (through changes in the price level), in asset
prices, and in relative spot commodity prices, while in our one-good model, asset
payoﬀs and spot commodity prices are ﬁxed.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economy in Section 2, and
analyze competitive equilibria in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider feasible welfare
changes and characterize the set of (potentially) welfare-improving changes in infor-
mation. In Section 5, we study equilibrium welfare eﬀects, and show that they are
typically arbitrary. Some of the more technical proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Economy
There are two periods, 0 and 1, and a single physical consumption good. The econ-
omy is populated by H ≥ 2 agents, with typical agent h ∈ H (here, and elsewhere,
we use the same symbol for a set and its cardinality). No consumption takes place at
date 0 and agents have no endowment in that period. Uncertainty, which is resolved
at date 1, is described by S states of the world.
Agent h ∈ H has an endowment at date 1 given by ωh ∈ RS
++, and preferences over
date 1 consumption described by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function uh : R++ → R, satisfying uh  > 0, uh   < 0, and
limc→0 uh [c]=∞. We denote the set of utility functions with these properties by U.
Asset markets, in which J ≥ 2 securities are traded, open at date 0. At date
1 assets pay oﬀ, and agents consume. The payoﬀ of asset j in state s is denoted
by rj
s, and the vector of asset payoﬀs in state s by rs ∈ RJ. By default all vectors
are column vectors, unless transposed. Thus r 
s =( r1
s ...r J
s). Let R be the S × J
matrix whose s’th row is r 
s . We assume that rs  = 0 for all s ∈ S,a n dR has
full column rank J. These assumptions are without loss of generality as the results
depend only on the asset span (the column space of R), and states in which no asset
pays oﬀ are irrelevant when considering the welfare eﬀect of changes in information.
We also assume that there is an asset, say asset J, whose payoﬀ is nonnegative in
every state. This condition, together with the monotonicity assumption on utility
by modeling the introduction of an asset in a way that avoids discontinuities. While the eﬀect of
increasing the information of agents on their trading possibilities has some analogies with the eﬀect
of introducing new securities, these are really two distinct problems (see Milne and Shefrin (1987)).
5functions, ensures that the equilibrium price of asset J is positive. It also guarantees
that budget constraints are satisﬁed with equality. Markets are complete if S = J,
and incomplete if S>J .
We model the information of agents as a public signal, observed prior to trading,
correlated with the state of the world s. This signal has support Σ, #Σ ≥ 2, with a
typical element of Σ denoted by σ. Having ﬁxed the spaces S and Σ, the information
of agents can be completely described by the probabilities π := {πsσ}s∈S,σ∈Σ ∈ RSΣ
++,
where πsσ denotes Prob(s,σ). We will identify a signal by the vector π associated
with it. The space of signals is thus Π := {π ∈ RSΣ
++ |
 
s,σ πsσ =1 }. Let πs|σ :=
Prob(s|σ),π s := Prob(s), and πσ := Prob(σ). A signal π is uninformative about s
if it satisﬁes the independence condition πsσ = πsπσ, for all s ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ. We will
often refer to a signal as an “information structure.”
Let ω := {ωh}h∈H ∈ Ω: =RSH
++, and u := {uh}h∈H ∈U H. An economy is
described by the tuple (ω,u,π) ∈E:= Ω ×U H × Π. We formalize our notion of
genericity as follows. The sets Ω and Π are endowed with the usual (Euclidean)
topology. The set U is endowed with the C2 uniform convergence topology on com-
pact sets, i.e. the sequence uh
n in U converges to uh if and only if uh
n,u h
n
  and uh
n
  
converge uniformly to uh,u h  and uh   respectively, on any compact subset of R++.
The set of economies E is endowed with the product topology. By “generic subset
of Ω,” we mean “for an open, dense subset of Ω,” and likewise for UH and Π. By
“generically” we mean “for an open, dense subset of E.”2
Transversality. We use the transversality theorem to establish our genericity results.
Since we employ the same argument at several diﬀerent points in the paper, it is
useful to summarize it here. Consider a function Ψ : Z ×E→Rn+1, where Z is an
open subset of Rn.F o re ∈E, let Ψe be the function Ψ(·,e). The argument involves
identifying such a function Ψ, such that the desired result can be formulated as
Ψ−1
e (0) = ∅, for every e in a generic subset of E. We show that the Jacobian Dz,eΨ
has full row rank at all zeros of Ψ, i.e. Ψ is transverse to zero. By the transver-
sality theorem, there is then a generic subset of E such that, for each e in this set,
Ψe : Z → Rn+1 is transverse to zero.3 It follows that Ψ−1
e (0) = ∅. In other words,
the equation system Ψe(z) = 0 has no solution since the number of (locally) inde-
pendent equations exceeds the number of unknowns.
Notation. In our analysis we use the following shorthand notation for matrices.
Given an index set N with typical element n, and a collection {zn}n∈N of vectors or
matrices, we denote by diagn∈N[zn] the (block) diagonal matrix with typical entry zn,
where n varies across all elements of N. For a given vector or matrix z, diagn∈N[z]i s
then the diagonal matrix with the term z repeated #N times. In similar fashion, we
2Only one of our main results, Theorem 5.1, requires perturbations of utility functions and the
(initial) information structure. The other results hold for a generic subset of endowments, and for
all (u,π) ∈U H × Π.
3Openness follows from a standard argument; see, for example, Citanna et al. (1998).
6write [...z n ... n∈N] to denote the row block with typical element zn, and analogously
for column blocks. We drop reference to the index set if it is obvious from the context:
for example diagh∈H is shortened to diagh, and [...z s ... s∈S,s =s1]t o[ ...z s ... s =s1]. We
use the same symbol 0 for the zero scalar and the zero matrix; in the latter case we
occasionally indicate the dimension in order to clarify the argument. We denote by
IN the N × N identity matrix, and by ˆ I the (J − 1) × J matrix (IJ−1 0). A “∗”
stands for any term whose value is immaterial to the analysis. The symbols ∼R and
∼C denote row and column equivalence, respectively.
We will sometimes need to order the set S (and similarly the sets Σ and H)a s
{s1,s 2,...}, s1 being the ﬁrst state, and so on.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
Consider an economy (ω,u,π) ∈E . Let yh
σ ∈ RJ denote the portfolio of agent h
when the signal realization is σ. Since portfolios uniquely determine consumption
(the consumption of agent h for state s and signal σ is given by ωh
s + rs · yh
σ), an
allocation is completely speciﬁed by a collection of portfolios, one for each agent h,
and each signal σ. For each σ, asset prices are given by a vector pσ ∈ RJ.
Let yσ := {yh
σ}h∈H, y := {yσ}σ∈Σ, and p := {pσ}σ∈Σ. A competitive equilibrium
is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given an economy (ω,u,π) ∈E , a competitive equilibrium consists
of an allocation y, and prices p, satisfying the following two conditions:




s πs|σ uh 
ωh
s + rs · x
 
subject to pσ · x =0 .
(1)




σ =0 . (2)
We will often refer to an equilibrium (y,p) of the economy (ω,u,π)a saπ-equilibrium
in order to emphasize the signal structure under consideration. Since asset J has a
nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ, we can choose it as the numeraire, setting (pσ)J =1 .
Let ˆ pσ denote the vector consisting of the ﬁrst J −1 elements of the price vector pσ.
Likewise, for given ˆ pσ, the corresponding pσ is given by {ˆ pσ,1}. Let ˆ p := {ˆ pσ}σ∈Σ.


















=0 , ∀h ∈ H,σ ∈ Σ (3)
pσ · y
h
σ =0 , ∀h ∈ H,σ ∈ Σ, (4)
7where λh
σ is the (positive) Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint
of agent h for signal σ. By Walras’ law, the market-clearing equation for one asset





σ =0 , ∀σ ∈ Σ, (5)
where ˆ yh
σ denotes the vector consisting of the ﬁrst J −1 elements of the portfolio yh
σ.
Let λσ := {λh
σ}h∈H, and λ := {λσ}σ∈Σ. A competitive equilibrium (y,p), together
with the associated Lagrange multipliers λ, must satisfy the equation system (3)–(5).
Indeed, (y,p) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisﬁes the system (3)–(5)
for some λ ∈ RHΣ
++. Let







































=0 , ∀σ ∈ Σ, (6)







where ξ := {ξσ}σ∈Σ =( y, ˆ p,λ), f := {fσ}σ∈Σ, and g := {gσ}σ∈Σ. Henceforth, we
identify a competitive equilibrium by ξ.I fπ is uninformative, we restrict attention
to equilibria that are σ-invariant.4
Consider the equilibrium system (6) for a given value of σ. These are (J +1)H +
(J −1) equations, equal to the number of unknowns. Taking ω to be a parameter of













   
ω
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4In other words, we ignore equilibria in which dependence on σ arises merely from randomization
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s + rs · yh
σ] is nonzero, for all h,s,σ. Also, Dyσgσ has full row rank, since
ˆ I =( IJ−1 0) and (pσ)J = 1, and therefore so does Dξσgσ. By a standard argument,
for a generic subset of endowments ΩRσ, the number of equilibria conditional on σ
(zeros of Fσ) is ﬁnite (and positive). Hence, for endowments in the generic subset
ΩR := ∩σ∈Σ ΩRσ, the number of equilibria (zeros of F) is ﬁnite as well.
Notice that πσ := {πsσ}s∈S is a parameter of Fσ. We will write Fσ(ξσ;πσ) when
we need to make this explicit, or when we wish to consider Fσ for a particular choice
of πσ.
4 Feasible Changes in Welfare
From the ﬁrst welfare theorem it follows that competitive equilibria in a complete
markets economy are ex-post Pareto eﬃcient, i.e. Pareto eﬃcient conditional on each
realization of σ. If markets are incomplete, on the other hand, competitive equilibria
are ex-post Pareto ineﬃcient for a generic subset of endowments, while being always
ex-post constrained Pareto eﬃcient, where the set of feasible allocations are those
that can be achieved with the available assets. These results are well known (see, for
example, Magill and Quinzii (1996)), and will serve as a benchmark for our welfare
analysis.
Given an initial information structure, and a corresponding competitive equilib-
rium, we wish to investigate whether an increase in information, or more generally
a change in information, can lead to an ex-post (and hence also ex-ante) welfare im-
provement via a reallocation of the available assets. It is convenient to formulate this
in terms of whether the allocation under consideration is ex-post ineﬃcient relative
to the new information. We say that a portfolio allocation y is feasible if it satisﬁes
(2).
Deﬁnition 4.1 A π-equilibrium allocation y is π-eﬃcient if there does not exist a






















≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ,
where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
In this deﬁnition, a feasible allocation is one that can be achieved with the existing
assets, as in the above notion of constrained eﬃciency. In order to interpret the
9change in the signal structure from π to π as a purely informational change, π must











πsσ = πs,∀s ∈ S
 
.
Clearly Ππ ⊂ Π. Notice that both the allocations y and y are evaluated at the same
odds, given by π. It would not be sensible to evaluate y at the initial information
structure π, and y at the new information structure π (doing so can lead to the
possibility of a “Pareto improvement” with no change in the allocation).
While a π-equilibrium is π-eﬃcient (this being just a restatement of the fact that it
is constrained ex-post Pareto eﬃcient), it is not in general π-eﬃcient. In other words,
while a competitive equilibrium makes eﬃcient use of the available information, there
is in general a change in information that admits a Pareto improvement. We now
study such informational changes.
We ﬁx an initial information structure π ∈ Π, and characterize the set of alter-
native information structures π ∈ Ππ such that π-equilibria are π-ineﬃcient. It is
straightforward to check that this set is empty if markets are complete (see Lemma
4.1 below). On the other hand, if markets are incomplete, we show that generically
an ex-post Pareto improvement can be attained for a large set of π’s. The main re-
sults of this section, Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, formalize this statement in diﬀerent
ways. We prove Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 for an arbitrary initial information structure
π ∈ Π. They can, of course, be specialized to the case where π is uninformative, as
is typically assumed in the literature.
We use the shorthand uh
sσ

















similarly for the second derivatives, uh
sσ
   and uh
sσ
  .
Lemma 4.1 Suppose markets are complete. Then a π-equilibrium is π-eﬃcient for
all π ∈ Π.
Proof:
Consider a π-equilibrium allocation y. Since markets are complete, y is ex-post
Pareto eﬃcient and this property, characterized by the equality of agents’ marginal














 , ∀h,ˆ h ∈ H; s, ˆ s ∈ S; σ ∈ Σ,
is independent of the value of π. Hence, there cannot be an allocation which ex-post
Pareto dominates y, for any π.5 
If markets are complete, all states are insurable (an insurable state is a state s ∈ S
5Notice that Lemma 4.1 applies for all π ∈ Π, and not just for π ∈ Ππ.
10for which the corresponding Arrow security can be replicated with the existing as-
sets). Changing the relative probabilities of these states does not admit an ex-post
Pareto improvement as all gains from trade (conditional on any σ) have already been
exhausted in equilibrium.
When markets are incomplete, risk sharing and the possibility of a welfare im-
provement with a change in information can be characterized in terms of what we call
insurable events. An insurable event is a generalization of the concept of an insurable
state. We will show that gains from trade are exhausted in equilibrium across these
events, while this is generically not the case within such events. While a change in
information that aﬀects only the relative probabilities of insurable events does not
admit an ex-post Pareto improvement, such an improvement can typically be found
for informational changes that aﬀect the relative probabilities of states within an
insurable event.
We formalize the notion of an insurable event as follows.6 Consider a partition
of S given by S(R): ={S1,...,S K}. For each k ∈ K := {1,...,K}, let Lk be
the subspace of RJ spanned by the vectors {rs}s∈Sk. We say that the subspaces
L1,...,L K are linearly independent if
 
k∈K  k =0 , k ∈ Lk, implies  k = 0 for
all k. Henceforth, we choose S(R) to be the partition for which L1,...,L K are
linearly independent, and K is maximal (it is easy to check that there is a unique
such partition). We call Sk ∈S (R)a ninsurable event. We justify this choice of
terminology below, and show that this is indeed a generalization of the notion of an
insurable state.
We denote the dimension of Lk by Jk. Thus we have
 
k∈K Jk = J. Without
loss of generality we can order the states in S so that the ﬁrst S1 states correspond
to the event S1, the following S2 states correspond to the event S2, and so on. The
partition S(R) is invariant to changes in asset payoﬀs that do not aﬀect the column
span of R. Moreover, R is column-equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix, with each
block corresponding to an insurable event Sk:7
Lemma 4.2 Suppose the asset payoﬀ matrices R and R  are column-equivalent.
Then S(R)=S(R ). Furthermore, R is column-equivalent to diagk∈K[Rk], where
Rk is an Sk × Jk matrix with rank(Rk)=Jk.
The proof is in the Appendix. It follows from this result that, if agents’ endowments
are measurable with respect to S(R), i.e. constant in each cell Sk, then competitive
equilibria are ex-post Pareto eﬃcient. For general endowments, if an equilibrium
allocation is not ex-post Pareto eﬃcient, it must be because of unexploited gains
from trade within an insurable event. All gains from trade across insurable events
are exhausted in equilibrium.
We say that an insurable event Sk is trivial if it is a singleton, and nontrivial
otherwise. A trivial insurable event consists of a single insurable state, while a
6Here we draw on Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1989). See, in particular, the analysis at the
beginning of Section III of that paper.
7If there is only one insurable event, this block-diagonal matrix has only one diagonal block.
11nontrivial insurable event (which exists if and only if markets are incomplete) consists
of two or more states, none of which is insurable. An insurable event Sk is nontrivial
if and only if Jk <S k. We say that the asset payoﬀ matrix R is in general position
if every J ×J submatrix of R is nonsingular. If markets are incomplete, and R is in
general position, there is only one insurable event, i.e. S(R)={S}.8
Given an allocation y, and information structure π, let
μ
hˆ h













denote the ratio of marginal utilities of asset J for agents h and ˆ h, conditional on
σ. Since asset J has a nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ, this is a positive scalar. A π-
equilibrium allocation y is π-eﬃcient if and only if the marginal rates of substitution

























, ∀h,ˆ h ∈ H; j ∈ J; σ ∈ Σ,
















rs =0 , ∀h,ˆ h ∈ H; σ ∈ Σ,
where μhˆ h
σ (πσ): =μhˆ h
σ (yσ,π σ). Since the subspaces L1,...,L K are linearly indepen-
















rs =0 , ∀h,ˆ h ∈ H; Sk ∈S (R); σ ∈ Σ.


























Then we can state the above result as follows:












rs =0 , ∀h,ˆ h ∈ H; Sk ∈S (R); σ ∈ Σ. (8)
Since a π-equilibrium is π-eﬃcient, condition (8) must hold at π = π. In other words,
at π, agents’ marginal utilities for assets are collinear in each insurable event. The
allocation y is π-ineﬃcient for all π’s that violate (8). The possibility of ﬁnding such
π’s arises from the following result:
8The converse is not true, however: S(R)={S} does not imply that R is in general position.
It is also worth noting that if R is in general position, so is any R  that is column-equivalent to R.
12Lemma 4.4 Suppose markets are incomplete. Let ˆ S be a subset of S that contains a
nontrivial insurable event, and suppose that there exists a portfolio with a nonnegative







 =0 , ∀μ ∈ R; h,ˆ h ∈ H; σ ∈ Σ. (9)
The proof is in the Appendix.9 In the special case where S = ˆ S, Lemma 4.4 says
that agents’ marginal utility vectors for state-contingent consumption, conditional
on σ, are generically not collinear (the condition on asset payoﬀs is satisﬁed since
asset J has a nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ in S). This is just the standard result
that competitive equilibria are generically ex-post Pareto ineﬃcient if markets are
incomplete. Lemma 4.4 strengthens this result by showing that agents’ marginal
utility vectors are generically not collinear in any nontrivial insurable event, subject
to a mild condition on asset payoﬀs. Combining this with our discussion of Lemma
4.2, we can conclude that in equilibrium, while there are no unexploited gains from
trade between insurable events, generically such gains do exist within each nontrivial
insurable event.
We now use Lemma 4.4 to show that, for a generic subset of endowments, and
for a generic choice of the information structure π, the π-eﬃciency condition (8) is
violated at any competitive equilibrium:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose markets are incomplete, and there are two assets whose pay-
oﬀs are not collinear in any pair of states. Then, for any π, there is a generic subset
ˆ Ω × ˆ Ππ of Ω × Ππ such that every π-equilibrium is π-ineﬃcient, for all π ∈ ˆ Ππ.
Proof:
Consider a π ∈ Π. It suﬃces to establish that condition (8) is violated for one value
of σ. Accordingly, ﬁx a value of σ. Recall from Section 3 that there is a generic
subset ΩRσ of Ω for which the Jacobian DξσFσ(ξσ;πσ) has full row rank, at all zeros
of Fσ(ξσ;πσ). Let ¯ Ω be the generic subset of Ω for which Lemma 4.4 holds. For the
rest of the proof, we restrict endowments to lie in the generic subset ˆ Ω: =Ω Rσ ∩ ¯ Ω.










 πsσ < πs,∀s ∈ S
 
,
which is the projection of Ππ onto the S-dimensional subspace of RSΣ corresponding
to the value of σ that we have ﬁxed. Let ˆ rs ∈ R2 be the payoﬀ in state s of two assets
that satisfy the non-collinearity condition of the theorem. We will show that, for πσ
in a generic subset of Πσ












9If s is an insurable state, ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ)) = 0, since equation (8) holds for π = π.
13for a given pair of agents h and ˆ h. Then, by Lemma 4.3, a Pareto improving real-
location exists conditional on σ. For any choice of πσ ∈ Πσ
π, we can always choose
{πσ}σ =σ, so that π ∈ Ππ, and ﬁnd a weakly Pareto improving reallocation for all
σ   = σ. Moreover, if πσ is in a generic subset of Πσ
π, the corresponding π is in a
generic subset of Ππ.









  ...¯ Δhˆ h




Since this is a block-triangular matrix, its rank is equal to the sum of the ranks of the
diagonal blocks. The upper left block has full row rank, and {¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μ)}s∈S is nonzero
by Lemma 4.4. Indeed, since ˆ rs and ˆ rs are not collinear, for any pair of states s,s ,
and
 
s∈S πsσ ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μ)ˆ rs = 0 at any zero of Ψ1, we must have ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μ)  = 0 for at least
three states in S. This implies that the lower right block of (10) has full row rank.
Therefore, the Jacobian Dξσ,μ,πσΨ1 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ1.T h u s
Ψ1 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
1πσ(0) = ∅, for every πσ in a generic subset of Πσ
π. 
Theorem 4.1 holds for π in a generic subset of Ππ. It does not specify this subset,
however. A πσ for which the π-eﬃciency condition (8) is violated for a pair of agents
h and ˆ h will depend on {¯ Δhˆ h
sσ}s∈S, and hence we cannot say whether π-equilibria are
π-ineﬃcient for a given choice of π, without reference to a particular equilibrium. On
the other hand, it is clear from (8) that a change in information that aﬀects only the
relative likelihood of insurable events (i.e. {πsσ}s∈Sk proportional to {πsσ}s∈Sk, for
all k ∈ K, σ ∈ Σ) does not admit an ex-post Pareto improvement. Agents’ marginal
utilities for assets remain collinear after such a change in information, which we can
therefore deem to be payoﬀ-irrelevant. This leads us to the following deﬁnition:10
Deﬁnition 4.2 Given π ∈ Π, an information structure π ∈ Ππ is payoﬀ-relevant if
{πsσ}s∈Sk is not proportional to {πsσ}s∈Sk, for some σ ∈ Σ, and for some insurable
event Sk ∈S (R).
Of course, if {πsσ}s∈Sk is not proportional to {πsσ}s∈Sk, then Sk must be nontrivial. If
markets are incomplete (so that a nontrivial insurable event exists), the set of payoﬀ-
relevant information structures is a generic subset of Ππ.11 Lemma 4.4 suggests that
a payoﬀ-relevant information structure π may admit an ex-post Pareto improvement.
Indeed, this is generically the case:
Theorem 4.2 Suppose markets are incomplete, and there exists a portfolio of the
ﬁrst J − 1 assets with a nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ. Then, for any π, and a
10The payoﬀ-relevance condition applies to a change in information from π to π. However, it is
easier to speak of π as being payoﬀ-relevant, taking π as given.
11As we have noted before, if R is in general position, there is only one insurable event, namely the
whole set S; in this case, any π for which πσ is not proportional to πσ, for some σ, is payoﬀ-relevant.
14payoﬀ-relevant π, there is a generic subset of Ω such that every π-equilibrium is
π-ineﬃcient.
Proof:
Consider a π ∈ Π, and a payoﬀ-relevant π ∈ Ππ. Fix a σ for which the payoﬀ-
relevance condition applies. Given the assumption in the theorem that there exists a
portfolio of the ﬁrst J −1 assets with a nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ, we can assume,
without loss of generality, that an asset j   = J has this property.
We will use the following result, which can be deduced from Lemma 5 of Geanako-
plos and Mas-Colell (1989):
Fact 1 Consider nonzero scalars θs,θ  
s, s ∈ S, such that {θs}s∈Sk is not proportional
to {θ 
s}s∈Sk, for some insurable event Sk ∈S (R). Then, diags[θs]R and diags[θ 
s]R








Since π is payoﬀ-relevant, Fact 1 implies that rank(R∗) ≥ J +1. Let rj ∈ RS denote
the payoﬀ of asset j. We pick an asset j1 such that diags[πsσ]rj1 lies outside the
column span of diags[πsσ]R. We pick a second asset j2 as follows. If rank(R∗) >J+1,
we choose j2 so that diags[πsσ]rj2 lies outside the column span of diags[πsσ]R. If, on
the other hand, rank(R∗)=J +1, we choose j2 to be either j  or J (if j1 happens to









either has rank J +2, or has rank J +1 and diags[πsσ]rj2 lies in the column span of
diags[πsσ]R.
Let ˆ rs ∈ R2 be the payoﬀ in state s of assets j1 and j2. We will show that, for a










This is the same system of equations as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, for a (possibly)
diﬀerent choice of ˆ rs, and of the pair of agents. Here we will be perturbing ω instead
of πσ.
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  ...πsσ uh1
sσ































We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank. Since Dξσgσ has full row rank,




  rs ... s
 








  ...πsσ uh1
sσ




  ...πsσ uh1
sσ
  rs ... s
 
has full row rank, J + 2. This matrix is column-equivalent to









  ...πsσ rs ... s
 
,
the transpose of which can be written as follows:
A2 :=
   
...π sσ uh2
sσ











We now exploit the properties of the matrix ˆ R∗, given by (11). If rank( ˆ R∗)=J+2,
A2 has full column rank and we are done. If not, we have
A2 ∼C
   
...π sσ uh2
sσ







  diags[πsσ]rj1 diags[πsσ]R
 
.
Since asset j2 has a nonnegative nonzero payoﬀ, the upper left block of this matrix
is a nonzero scalar, while the rank of the lower right block is J + 1. Therefore, A2
has full column rank for this case as well.
We have shown that the Jacobian Dξσ,μ,ωΨ2 has full row rank, at every zero of
Ψ2.T h u sΨ 2 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
2ω(0) = ∅, for every ω in a generic subset
of Ω. 
Theorem 4.2 shows that any payoﬀ-relevant π violates (8), with an appropriate
perturbation of {¯ Δhˆ h
sσ}s∈S, i.e. for a generic subset of Ω. This generic subset will
clearly depend on π (unlike the generic subset ˆ Ω in Theorem 4.1, which does not
depend on the choice of π in ˆ Ππ). Thus, while Theorem 4.2 improves upon Theorem
4.1 by identifying a generic subset of π’s for which equilibrium allocations are π-
ineﬃcient, it does not specify a generic subset of Ω for which a Pareto improving
16reallocation exists for all such π’s. We now show that, under some restrictions on
asset payoﬀs, there is a generic subset of Ω for which a Pareto improvement can be
attained for a large, albeit not necessarily generic, subset of π’s that can be explicitly
identiﬁed.
In order to develop this result in a notationally convenient manner, we will assume
that R takes the block-diagonal form diagk[Rk] and, if there is a trivial insurable
event, then SK is one such event. Due to Lemma 4.2, this assumption is without loss
of generality. In particular, it implies that asset J pays oﬀ only in event SK.12
Suppose markets are incomplete, there are at least two insurable events, and the
initial information structure π is uninformative. We consider information structures
π that aﬀect the relative probabilities of states in a nontrivial insurable event Sk,
k  = K, but not in SK (if SK is trivial, then the latter condition is irrelevant). As we
will verify in the proof of Theorem 4.3 below, this implies that μhˆ h
σ (πσ)=μhˆ h
σ (πσ),
and ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ)) is σ-invariant for all s ∈ Sk. In Lemma A.1 in the Appendix
we show that ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ)) is nonzero, for all s ∈ Sk, for a generic subset of Ω
(thus strengthening the non-collinearity condition (9) for a particular value of μ,
namely μ = μhˆ h
σ (πσ)). The π-eﬃciency condition (8) is then violated if the change in












has suﬃciently high rank. Formally, we have:
Theorem 4.3 Suppose markets are incomplete, there are at least two insurable events,
and π is uninformative. Let Sk be a nontrivial insurable event, k  = K. Then, for a
generic subset of Ω, every π-equilibrium is π-ineﬃcient, for all π ∈ Ππ satisfying
(a) rank(ΠSk) >S k − Jk; and
(b) {πsσ}s∈SK is collinear with {πsσ}s∈SK, for all σ ∈ Σ.
Proof:
Consider a π-equilibrium allocation y, a nontrivial insurable event Sk, and a π ∈ Ππ
satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Suppose y is π-eﬃcient. Then, by Lemma












rs =0 , ∀σ ∈ Σ. (12)
12If SK is trivial, then asset J pays oﬀ only in the last state. Of course, SK may be nontrivial,
and may even be the whole state space S (if there is only one insurable event).
17Exploiting the fact that asset J pays oﬀ only in the event SK, and using condition
(b) in the statement of the theorem, we see that μhˆ h
σ (πσ)=μhˆ h
σ (πσ), for all σ ∈ Σ.












rs =0 , ∀σ ∈ Σ. (13)
Due to the assumption that π is uninformative, the marginal utilities uh
sσ





σ-invariant, and so is μhˆ h
σ (πσ). It follows that ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ)) is σ-invariant. Condition












Since rank(ΠSk) >S k − Jk, the rank of diags∈Sk[¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ))]Rk must be strictly
less than Jk. Therefore, ¯ Δhˆ h
sσ(μhˆ h
σ (πσ)) = 0 for some s ∈ Sk. By Lemma A.1, this
condition is violated for a generic subset of Ω. 
Notice that condition (b) is automatically satisﬁed if SK is trivial. The theorem
generalizes Theorem 5 of Blume et al. (2006). Their result corresponds to the case
where SK is trivial (they assume that one of the assets is an Arrow security); they
also impose a stronger full rank condition (in our notation, their assumption is that
rank(ΠS1 ...ΠSK)=S). While in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 it suﬃced to consider a
change in the information structure for only two values of σ, for example an ap-
propriate choice of πσ1 that admits a Pareto improvement conditional on σ1, and a
corresponding choice of πσ2 to satisfy the adding-up condition π ∈ Ππ, Theorem 4.3
requires an independent change in information across at least Sk − Jk values of σ.13
The corresponding π must therefore be payoﬀ-relevant for these values. In Theorems
4.1 and 4.2, the set of π’s for which π-equilibria are π-ineﬃcient is a generic subset
of Ππ, but this is not the case in Theorem 4.3 unless SK is trivial.
5 Equilibrium Changes in Welfare
We have shown that, for any π-equilibrium, there is a rich set of information struc-
tures that allow a Pareto improvement. For every information structure π in this
set, there is an ex-post Pareto improving reallocation of the given assets. A natural
question to ask is whether there exists a π such that an associated π-equilibrium
Pareto dominates the π-equilibrium under consideration. In this section we provide
an aﬃrmative answer to this question, for a generic economy. It is indeed typically
possible to ﬁnd an information structure π, and a corresponding π-equilibrium, such
that all agents are better oﬀ ex-ante.14 But it is also possible to ﬁnd a π such that
13Condition (a) allows for the possibility that the relative probabilities of the states in Sk are the
same under π and π for one value of σ.
14Whether this is possible ex-post remains an open question.
18all agents are worse oﬀ. Indeed, the welfare eﬀects in equilibrium of a change in
information can go in any direction. The proof of this result exploits the general
framework laid out in Citanna et al. (1998), and exposited more fully in Villanacci
et al. (2002), Chapter 15.

























be the vector of diﬀerences in the ex-ante expected utilities of agents between the
two allocations. We consider local changes in (π,y) in a neighborhood of (π,y).
With no change in information, there is no change in welfare: U(π,y;y) = 0. An
ex-ante Pareto improvement is attained in equilibrium if U(π,y;y) is nonnegative
and nonzero. We show, in fact, that it is possible to generate a local change in U in
any direction, for a generic economy. Our result requires that markets are suﬃciently
incomplete, and that the heterogeneity of agents is not too large.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose S ≥ 2JH, J ≥ H, and R is in general position. Then, for
a generic subset of E, for any π-equilibrium allocation y, there exists a local change
in information dπ, and a corresponding local change in the equilibrium allocation dy,
such that U(π + dπ,y + dy;y) is any desired vector in RH.
Proof:
We ﬁx an economy e ∈E, with information structure π, and consider a π-equilibrium
given by ξ =( y,ˆ p,λ). With a slight abuse of notation, we can write the equilibrium
system (7) as F(π,ξ)=0 .T h u s( π,ξ) is a zero of F if and only if ξ is a π-equilibrium.





F(π,ξ)   






where y is the allocation corresponding to ξ, and ˚ y is any (exogenously given) al-
location. Notice that Φ(π,ξ;y) = 0. The theorem is established by showing that
the Jacobian of Φ(π,ξ;˚ y) with respect to (π,ξ) has full row rank at (π,ξ;y), i.e.
Dπ,ξΦ(π,ξ;y) has full row rank. This full rank property implies that there is a local
change (dπ,dξ) such that dΦ(π,ξ;y) is any desired vector. In particular, (dπ,dξ)
can be chosen so that dU(π,y;y): =U(π+dπ,y+dy;y) is any desired vector in RH,
dF(π,ξ): =F(π + dπ,ξ + dξ) = 0, and
 
σ dπsσ = 0 for all s ∈ S. The latter two
conditions ensure that (π + dπ) ∈ Ππ, and (ξ + dξ)i sa( π + dπ)-equilibrium.















































































Notice that we can eliminate the term λ
h
σpσ in the (2,1) block with column opera-






















































In the Appendix we show that, for every competitive equilibrium of a generic
economy, under the dimensionality restrictions in the statement of the theorem, the
portfolios and marginal utilities of agents satisfy the following conditions:15
C1. The vectors {ˆ yh
σ}h∈H,h =h1 are linearly independent, for all σ ∈ Σ.
C2. The vectors (...λ
h1
σ ... σ) and (...λ
h2
σ ... σ) are not collinear.
C3. Q(y) has full row rank.
Each of these conditions holds for a diﬀerent generic subset of E (see Lemmas A.2, A.4
and A.6). In the remainder of the proof, we assume that the economy e considered
in the foregoing analysis is in the intersection of these three generic subsets. Thus
e is a generic economy for which conditions C1, C2 and C3 hold. We will prove
that, for such an economy, (15) has full row rank, and hence so does the Jacobian
Dπ,ξΦ(π,ξ;y).
15The choice of agent h1 in condition C1, and agents h1 and h2 in condition C2, is just a matter
of convenience.
20Since (15) is a block-triangular matrix, it suﬃces to show full row rank of the
two blocks along the north-east diagonal. The matrix Q(y) has full row rank due to













  diagσ[...ˆ y
h


















where we have used (3) to evaluate DyU, the (3,1) block of (17). Consider the top
two submatrices of (17). Adding the rows corresponding to agents h  = h1 to the row











  diagσ[...ˆ y
h



























We need to verify that this matrix has full row rank. It is block-triangular, and the
upper right block has full row rank by C1. It remains to show that the lower left block











































































































This is again a block-triangular matrix. The ﬁrst diagonal block has full row rank,
since ˆ I =( IJ−1 0) and (pσ)J = 1. The middle diagonal block has full row rank due
to C2. The third diagonal block clearly has full row rank as well. Hence the whole
matrix has full row rank as desired. 
21A Appendix
We ﬁrst provide proofs of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4 stated in Section 4, and of Lemma
A.1 that was invoked in the proof of Theorem 4.3. We then establish conditions C1,
C2 and C3, that were used in the proof of Theorem 5.1, for a generic subset of E.
Proof of Lemma 4.2:
The matrices R and R  are column-equivalent if and only if R  = RX, for some J ×J
nonsingular matrix X. Let S(R)={S1,...,S K}, and let ¯ Rk be the Sk×J submatrix
of R consisting of the rows of R corresponding to the states in Sk. Similarly, let ¯ R 
k
be the Sk × J submatrix of R  corresponding to Sk. Consider a vector a ∈ RS, and
let ak ∈ RSk be the elements of a corresponding to Sk.W eh a v ea R  = a RX and
a 
k ¯ R 
k = a 
k ¯ RkX.
Now suppose a R  = 0. Then a R =
 
k∈K a 
k ¯ Rk = 0. Since the subspaces {Lk}
are linearly independent, we must have a 
k ¯ Rk = 0, for all k. It follows that a 
k ¯ R 
k =0 ,
for all k, and hence the subspaces {L 
k} are linearly independent. Moreover, since
{Lk} is a maximal set of linearly independent subspaces, so is {L 
k}. This establishes
that S(R)=S(R ).
We now show that there exists a J × J nonsingular matrix X such that RX
has the block-diagonal structure in the statement of the theorem. Let Mk be the
Jk-dimensional subspace of RJ that is the orthogonal complement of the subspace
generated by {Lˆ k}ˆ k =k. We claim that the subspaces {Mk} are linearly independent.
Indeed, consider mk ∈ Mk such at
 
k mk = 0. Then,  k ·
 
k mk = 0, for all  k ∈ Lk.
But  k · mˆ k = 0, for all ˆ k  = k. Therefore,  k ·
 
k mk =  k · mk = 0, for all  k ∈ Lk,
i.e. mk is orthogonal to Lk. By the deﬁnition of Mk, mk is orthogonal to Lˆ k, for all
ˆ k  = k. Consequently, mk is orthogonal to RJ, implying that it is zero. The same
argument applies for all values of k.
Let Xk be a J × Jk matrix whose columns are a basis of Mk. Thus every
column of Xk is orthogonal to every row of R that does not correspond to the
states in Sk. Therefore, ¯ Rˆ kXk = 0, for all ˆ k  = k. Let X := (X1 ...X K). Then
RX = diagk[Rk], where Rk := ¯ RkXk,a nSk × Jk matrix. Since the subspaces {Mk}
are linearly independent, X is nonsingular. This proves that R ∼C diagk[Rk]. More-
over, rank(Rk)=r a n k (¯ Rk)=Jk. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4:
Let ˆ S be a subset of S satisfying the conditions of the lemma. We choose a pair of
states in ˆ S, in a manner that we specify later in the proof. It is convenient to reorder
the states in S so that these are the ﬁrst two states, labeled s1 and s2. It suﬃces to
establish the result for the ﬁrst two agents, h1 and h2. We will show that generically











22The system Ψ3 is obtained from the equilibrium system Fσ by appending one addi-
tional variable, μ, and two additional equations.


























































































  ...πsσ uh1
sσ


































We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank. Since Dξσgσ has full row rank,




  rs ... s
 























  ...πsσ uh1
sσ























































  πs1σ uh2
s1σ


















  ...r s ... s/ ∈{s1,s2}
 
has rank J. We now argue that this is indeed the case, for an appropriate choice of
the states s1 and s2.
23By assumption, ˆ S contains a nontrivial insurable event, say Sk, so that Jk <S k.
If Jk ≤ Sk −2, we can choose s1 and s2 in Sk such that both rs1 and rs2 are spanned
by the vectors {rs}s∈Sk,s/ ∈{s1,s2}. Then the right submatrix of B has rank J, and hence
so does B. Suppose then that Jk = Sk −1. Let s1 be any state in Sk. The vector rs1
must be in the span of {rs}s∈Sk,s =s1 (if this is not the case, then s1 is an insurable
state, contradicting the fact that s1 belongs to the nontrivial insurable event Sk). If
Sk is a strict subset of ˆ S, let s2 be a state in ˆ S that is not in Sk. Then rs1 is in the





  ...r s ... s/ ∈{s1,s2}
 
,
which has rank J.
The only case that remains to be considered, therefore, is the one where ˆ S = Sk,
with Jk = Sk − 1. As before, let s1 be any state in Sk. We claim that there is a
state s2 ∈ Sk, such that rank(B)=J. Suppose not. Then, there exist coeﬃcients












αˆ s,s rs, ∀ˆ s ∈ Sk.




















rs =0 . (18)
We now invoke the assumption that there exists a portfolio whose payoﬀ is nonneg-
ative and nonzero in ˆ S.16 In the case under consideration, ˆ S = Sk. Hence, there
exists x∗ ∈ RJ such that rs · x∗ ≥ 0 for all s ∈ Sk, and rs · x∗ > 0 for some s ∈ Sk.




 rs · x∗ > 0, which contradicts (18).
We have shown that Dξσ,μ,ωΨ3 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ3.T h u sΨ 3 is
transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
3ω(0) = ∅ for all ω in a generic subset of Ω. 
16This is the only place in the proof where we use this assumption. Thus the assumption is
needed only for the case where ˆ S is a nontrivial insurable event Sk, and Jk = Sk − 1.
24Lemma A.1 Suppose markets are incomplete, and there are at least two insurable
events. Let Sk be a nontrivial insurable event, k  = K. Then, for a generic subset of










 =0 , ∀s ∈ Sk; h,ˆ h ∈ H; σ ∈ Σ.
Proof :
Let Sk be a nontrivial insurable event, k  = K. It suﬃces to establish the result for
the pair of agents h1 and h2, and for one state in Sk, which we take to be the ﬁrst
state s1, for convenience in writing the matrix computations below. We show that









σ (yσ,ω;πσ) − μ
⎞
⎠ =0 .
The Jacobian Dξσ,μ,ωΨ4, evaluated at a zero (ξσ,μh1h2
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where we have used the fact that the payoﬀ of asset J in s1 is zero (since asset J
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25has full row rank, J + 2. Exploiting once again the fact that rJ
s1 = 0, we can do a














   
  uh1
s1σ





  πs1σ uh1
s1σ
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  ...πsσ uh1
sσ






Since Sk is a nontrivial insurable event, rs1 is in the span of {rs}s∈Sk,s =s1. It follows
that the bottom right block has rank J. Hence rank(A4)=J + 2 as desired.
We have established that Ψ4 is transverse to zero, so that Ψ
−1
4ω(0) = ∅ for all ω
in a generic subset of Ω. 
Lemma A.2 Suppose J ≥ H. Then, for a generic subset ΩY of Ω, condition C1 is
satisﬁed at any equilibrium.
Proof :








5 ψ5 − 1
⎞
⎠ =0 ,
where ψ5 ∈ RH−1, and Yσ is the square matrix obtained from [...ˆ yh
σ ... h] by deleting
the ﬁrst column and the last J − H rows. We will show that, for a generic subset
of endowments, this system has no solution, and hence Yσ has full rank at any
equilibrium.






























































σ 0 ... 0




5 0] ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
00 ... p  
σ















26Since (pσ)J = 1 and, at any zero of Ψ5, ψ5  = 0, (20) has full row rank, and hence
so does the lower left block of (19). Furthermore, Dωfσ has full row rank. It follows
that the Jacobian Dξσ,ψ5,ωΨ5 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ5.T h u s Ψ 5 is
transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
5ω(0) = ∅ for all ω ∈ ΩYσ, a generic subset of Ω. The set
ΩY in the statement of the lemma is given by ΩY := ∩σ∈Σ ΩYσ. 
In order to establish conditions C2 and C3, we will need to independently perturb
the marginal utilities of agents, for diﬀerent signal realizations σ. This cannot be
achieved via endowment perturbations, since endowments do not vary with respect
to σ. Instead, we perturb the (initial) information structure π. As a ﬁrst step we
show that, for a generic subset of endowments, marginal utilities vary suﬃciently









s πsσ1 − πσ1
fσ2(ξσ2,π2,ω)  






where πi := {πsσi}s∈S, and πσi is an arbitrary constant in (0,1), i =1 ,2. We show
in Lemma A.3 below that, for a generic subset of endowments, Dπ1,π2W has full row
rank at any equilibrium. Note that we are considering perturbations in π1 and π2
that leave πσ1 and πσ2 unchanged. In particular this ensures that the perturbations
lie in the set Π. Lemma A.3 is invoked in all the lemmas that follow (the assumptions
in the statement of Lemma A.3 are implied by those in the statements of Lemmas
A.4, A.5 and A.6).
Lemma A.3 Suppose S ≥ J(H +1 )+1 , and R is in general position. Let π ∈ Π
be an information structure with
 
s πsσ = πσ. Then, for a generic subset ΩW of Ω,
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27and 1  =( 11 ...1)1×(JH+1). We claim that, for a generic subset of Ω, at a π-







































































We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank at any zero of Ψ6. As we have
seen already, Dξσgσ has full row rank. Also, ψ6 is orthogonal to 1 and nonzero (since
ψ 
6 ψ6 = 1). Hence, due to the block-triangular structure of (21), it suﬃces to show
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has full row rank. This matrix is row-equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix, with




   rs ... s≤JH+1
 
  ...π sσ uh
sσ










This matrix is block-triangular as well, and its upper right block has full row rank
since it has at least J columns and R is in general position. It remains to show
that the lower left block of (22) has full row rank. Let ¯ S be the subset of states
for which ψ6s  = 0. This is a nonempty subset at any zero of Ψ6.17 Then we have  
s∈¯ S ψ6suh
sσ
  rs = 0. Since R is in general position, and uh
sσ
  is nonzero for all s,w e
must have #¯ S ≥ J + 1. Full row rank of the lower left block of (22) now follows
from the general position of R.
17 ¯ S may depend on the zero of Ψ6 we are considering, but this does not aﬀect our argument.
28We have shown that the Jacobian Dξσ,ψ6,ωΨ6 has full row rank, at every zero of
Ψ6.T h u sΨ 6 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
6ω(0) = ∅ for all ω ∈ ΩWσ, a generic subset
of Ω. This establishes that ˘ Γσ has full row rank. It follows that Dπ1,π2W has full
row rank for the generic subset of endowments ΩW := ΩWσ1∩ ΩWσ2. 
Lemma A.4 Suppose S ≥ J(H +1 )+1 , and R is in general position. Then, for a
generic subset of Ω × Π, condition C2 is satisﬁed at any equilibrium.
Proof :
We restrict endowments to lie in the generic subset ΩW of Ω for which Dπ1,π2W has













s πsσ1 − πσ1  















































Since Dyσgσ has full row rank, and λh
σ  = 0 for all σ, it follows that the lower left
block of the above matrix has full row rank. Since Dπ1,π2W also has full row rank,
the Jacobian Dξσ1,ξσ2,π1,π2Ψ7 has full row rank. Thus Ψ7 is transverse to zero, and
Ψ
−1
7π(0) = ∅ for all π in a generic subset of Π. 
In order to establish condition C3, we will employ ﬁnite-dimensional perturba-
tions of the agents’ utility functions. This procedure requires the following result.
Lemma A.5 Suppose S ≥ J(H +1 )+1 , J ≥ H, and R is in general position.
Then, for a generic subset ΩC × ΠC of Ω × Π, at any equilibrium, ch
ˆ sˆ σ  = ch
ˇ sˇ σ for all
(ˆ s, ˆ σ)  =( ˇ s, ˇ σ), and for all h ∈ H.
Proof :
Consider ﬁrst the case where ˆ s  =ˇ s and ˆ σ =ˇ σ. Without loss of generality, we can
take ˆ s = s1 and ˇ s = s2, and prove the result for the ﬁrst agent, h1, for a given σ.W e









Here we use ch
sσ as shorthand notation for ωh
s +rs ·yh
σ, not as an additional variable.

































diagh[... π sσ uh
sσ
   rs ... s]
———————————–






Note that the zero block in the lower right of (23) corresponds to all agents other








   rs1 πs2σ uh1
s2σ
   rs2 [...π sσ uh1
sσ











  diagh =h1[...π sσ uh
sσ







The lower right submatrix of (24) has full row rank due to the general position
of R. The (1,3) block of the upper left submatrix of (24) also has full row rank
for the same reason (note that the assumed dimensionality condition implies that
S ≥ J + 2). Consequently, the whole matrix (24) has full row rank, and hence so
does (23). Furthermore, due to the full row rank of Dξσgσ, the Jacobian Dξσ,ωΨ8 has
full row rank as well. Thus Ψ8 is transverse to 0, and Ψ
−1
8ω(0) = ∅ for all ω ∈ Ω1σ,a
generic subset of Ω. Let Ω1 := ∩σ∈Σ Ω1σ.
Now consider the case where ˆ σ  =ˇ σ, while ˆ s may or may not be equal to ˇ s.
Without loss of generality, we can take ˆ σ = σ1, ˇ σ = σ2, and ˆ s = s1, and prove the
result for the ﬁrst agent, h1. We restrict the set of endowments to the generic subset
ΩY ∩ ΩW, for which condition C1 holds and Dπ1,π2W has full row rank (see Lemmas












s πsσ1 − πσ1  























































Since Dπ1,π2W has full row rank, it suﬃces to show that the lower left block of the
above matrix has full row rank. This block is itself block-triangular, and Dξσ2gσ2 has





















  [...ˆ yh












Consider the middle row block of this matrix. Adding the rows corresponding to all



























  ...p  








  diagh =h1[p 
σ1]
 
  [...ˆ yh

























  diagh =h1[p 
σ1]
 
  [...ˆ yh





































This matrix has a block-triangular structure. Since condition C1 holds, the top right
diagonal block has full row rank. The middle diagonal block has full row rank since
ˆ I =( IJ−1 0) and the Jth element of pσ1 is nonzero. The bottom left block is nonzero
by the general position of R.
It follows that the Jacobian Dξσ1,ξσ2,π1,π2Ψ9 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ9.
Thus Ψ9 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
9π(0) = ∅ for all π ∈ ΠC, a generic subset of Π.
The set ΩC in the statement of the lemma is given by ΩC := Ω1 ∩ ΩY ∩ ΩW. 
The space of utility functions U is inﬁnite-dimensional. For the genericity ar-
guments that we use in order to establish condition C3, it suﬃces to consider a
ﬁnite-dimensional submanifold of U. This submanifold consists of linear perturba-
tions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index of each agent in the neighbor-
31hood of consumption in each state (s,σ), for a given equilibrium. This is a standard
construction (see, for example, Citanna et al. (1998)).18
Consider an economy (ˇ ω,ˇ u, ˇ π) ∈ ΩC×U H×ΠC, and a corresponding equilibrium
with consumption allocation {ˇ ch
sσ}h∈H,s∈S,σ∈Σ. By Lemma A.5, the consumption level
of agent h,ˇ ch
sσ, is distinct across (s,σ), for all h. Therefore, we can ﬁnd open intervals
ˇ Bh
sσ,Bh
sσ such that ˇ ch
sσ ∈ ˇ Bh
sσ   Bh
sσ ⊂ R++, where the intervals Bh
sσ are disjoint across
(s,σ). Deﬁne C2 functions ρh
sσ : R++ → [0,1] such that ρh
sσ =1o n ˇ Bh
sσ and ρh
sσ =0o n
the complement of Bh
sσ.19 Now consider the class of utility functions uh parametrized











sσ(c − ˇ c
h
sσ).































Let νσ := {νh
sσ}h∈H,s∈S, and ν := {νσ}σ∈Σ. In order to show that condition C3 holds,
we will perturb utility functions via perturbations of ν.
Lemma A.6 Suppose S ≥ 2JH, J ≥ H, and R is in general position. Then, for a
generic subset of E, condition C3 is satisﬁed at any equilibrium.
Proof :




















has full row rank, for all ˇ σ  =ˆ σ. Without loss of generality we can take ˇ σ = σ1 and
ˆ σ = σ2. Let ˆ Λ be the (square) submatrix of Λ consisting of the ﬁrst 2JH columns
of Λ. Let ψ10 ∈ R2JH. We will show that, for a generic subset of UH ×Π, there is no
solution to
18Unlike Citanna et al. (1998), we perturb the gradient of the utility functions instead of their
Hessian. Also, we have state-independent separable utility so additional care has to be exercised in
perturbing utilities in diﬀerent states.
19The existence of such a “bump” function is well-known. See Guillemin and Pollack (1974),
chapter 1.












Fσ2(ξσ2,ν σ2,π2)  
s πsσ1 − πσ1  
s πsσ2 − πσ2












We restrict ourselves to the generic subset of endowments and initial signals (ΩR ∩
ΩC)×ΠC for which Lemma A.5 applies, so that we can parametrize utility functions
by the vector ν, and for which the number of equilibria is ﬁnite. Recall that ΩC is a
subset of ΩW, for which Dπ1,π2W has full row rank (see Lemma A.3). The Jacobian,















































We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank. Since Dπ1,π2W, Dξσ1gσ1
and Dξσ2gσ2 have full row rank, and ψ10  = 0, it suﬃces to show that the mid-
dle block of (26) has full row rank. Using (25), we see that this block is block-
diagonal with respect to h ∈ H and σ ∈{ σ1,σ 2}, with typical diagonal term given
by [...ψ 10srs ... s≤2JH]. This diagonal term has full row rank by the same argu-
ment that we used for the bottom left block of (22). It follows that the Jacobian
Dξσ1,ξσ2,ψ10,νσ1,νσ2,π1,π2Ψ10 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ10.T h u sΨ 10 is trans-
verse to zero, and Ψ
−1
10uπ(0) = ∅ for all (u,π) ∈U H × ΠC.
Now that we have established that Λ has full row rank, consider the matrix Q,





... I S ... σ
 
.
The upper submatrix of Q has full row rank due to the full row rank of Λ, and clearly
the lower submatrix of Q has full row rank as well. If Q does not have full row rank,
there exist vectors aσ ∈ RJH, for all σ ∈ Σ, and b ∈ RS, not all of which are zero,
such that a 
σΛσ + b = 0, for all σ. Moreover, since Λσ has full row rank, b  =0 .
It follows that the row spaces of {Λσ}σ∈Σ have a nontrivial intersection. But this
contradicts the full row rank property of Λ.
The utility perturbations in this proof apply only to the particular equilibrium
under consideration. However, we can repeat the same construction for each equi-
librium, and take the intersection of the generic subsets for which the Jacobian of
Ψ10 has full row rank. This intersection is itself a generic subset since the number of
equilibria is ﬁnite (recall that endowments are restricted to ΩR). 
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